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Abstract1 
 
Since the 1990s a wide range of new sub-regional groups have emerged in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the former Soviet Union. This 
paper provides an assessment of the new European sub-regional groups, exploring 
why and how sub-regionalism has proliferated in Europe since the 1990s, analysing 
what functions sub-regional groups perform and evaluating their significance. The 
paper argues that European sub-regional groups have developed in three distinct 
phases: a formative, post-Cold War phase in the early 1990s when many of these 
groups were established; a second phase in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the 
eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO and the ending of the Yugoslav wars re-
shaped the dynamics of sub-regionalism; and a third post-enlargement phase in the 
late 2000s where attention has shifted to the role of sub-regionalism in a strategic 
environment where further enlargement of the EU and NATO (at least beyond the 
Balkans) appears unlikely and Russo-Western relations are more problematic. 
Moreover, the paper argues that the European sub-regional groups have four 
distinct roles: a bridge-building function across the ‘dividing lines’ between EU/NATO 
and their non-member neighbours and the geo-cultural divide between Europe and 
North Africa and the Middle East; an integrative function helping some member 
states to integrate into the EU and/or NATO; a role as frameworks for addressing 
transnational policy challenges; and a role as facilitators of political, economic and 
institutional reform in participating states. The paper concludes that although the 
European sub-regional groups lack the economic, military and institutional power of 
the EU and NATO, these groups have nevertheless played a positive role in fostering 
security and cooperation in their respective sub-regions and in the wider Europe as a 
whole. 
 
                                                 
1  A version of this paper will also be published by the EU4SEAS “The EU and Sub-regional 
Multilateralism in Europe’s Four Sea Basins: Neighbourhood, Enlargement and Multilateral 
Cooperation”, research project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under Grant Agreement no. 225382 (visit www.eu4seas.eu for 
further information). 
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Introduction 
 
Sub-regional cooperation has emerged as a new, if not always widely recognised, 
feature of Europe’s international politics in the last two decades. Alongside the larger 
and better known European international organisations – the European Union (EU), 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – sits a plethora of sub-
regional groups. Table 1 below summarises the main European sub-regional groups 
that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. These groups exist primarily in the 
geo-political space bordering and beyond the now enlarged EU and NATO: 
Northern, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the 
former Soviet Union. Most of these groups were created in the early and mid-1990s 
and by the late 2000s they have become relatively established bodies, with a 
diplomatic and institutional momentum of their own reflected in regular meetings of 
their member states at various levels and on-going programmes and activities (for 
earlier analyses of these groups see Cottey, 1999 and Cottey, 2000).  
 
This paper provides an assessment of the European sub-regional groups, exploring 
why and how sub-regionalism has proliferated in Europe since the 1990s, analysing 
what functions sub-regional groups perform and evaluating their significance. I 
argue that European sub-regionalism has developed in three phases: a first, 
formative phase in the early 1990s when the end of the Cold War created both a 
new strategic context in which sub-regional cooperation became possible and new 
challenges to which sub-regional cooperation was one response; a second phase in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s when the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO 
resulted in new sub-regional initiatives designed to mitigate the inevitable ‘dividing 
lines’ created by enlargement and the ending of the Yugoslav wars triggered a 
period of intensive sub-regional institution-building in the Balkans; and a third post-
enlargement phase in the late 2000s where attention has shifted to the role of sub-
regionalism in a strategic environment where further enlargement of the EU and 
NATO (at least beyond the Balkans) appears unlikely and Russo-Western relations are 
more problematic. In terms of sub-regional groups’ functions, I argue that these 
groups have four distinct roles: a bridge-building function across the ‘dividing lines’ 
between EU/NATO and their non-member neighbours and the geo-cultural divide 
between Europe and North Africa and the Middle East; an integrative function 
helping some member states to integrate into the EU and/or NATO; a role as 
frameworks for addressing transnational policy challenges (such as environmental 
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degradation and organised criminality); and a role as facilitators of political, 
economic and institutional reform in participating states. I also analyse the impact of 
the European sub-regional groups. While noting the inherent difficulties from a social 
scientific perspective of assessing the impact of international institutions and the 
reality that the European sub-regional groups are relatively lightweight compared to 
the larger European organisations (the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE), I argue that there is nevertheless, a good case that these groups have 
helped to overcome the Cold War division of the continent, facilitated the 
integration of some states into the EU and NATO, contributed to reform processes in 
post-communist Europe and North Africa, assisted in addressing transnational policy 
challenges in areas such as the environment, helped mitigate some potential 
negative consequences of NATO and EU enlargement and diminished ‘civilisational’ 
tensions across the Mediterranean. 
 
Before examining the European sub-regional groups in detail, some brief 
observations should be made on the meaning and significance of the term sub-
region. The term sub-region refers to geographical-political spaces which are sub-
sets of a larger regional space. The definition of regions and sub-regions is 
problematic and often contentious, both in terms of abstraction/theory and in 
individual cases. Similarly, there is debate over the nature of and distinctions 
between regional (or sub-regional) cooperation, (sub-)regionalism, (sub-)regional 
identity-building and (sub-)regional integration as processes. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that over the last twenty years or so regions, regionalism and regional integration 
have emerged as growing factors in global politics. The existence of regions creates 
also the possibility of sub-regional cooperation – that is cooperation amongst states 
(and/or other actors) on the basis of a geographically defined sub-area of the larger 
region. In the European case this has particular significance: if the larger region here 
is the European continent, the defining political feature of the European continent 
today is the process of political, economic and security integration embodied in the 
EU and NATO and this context is the key to understanding the European sub-regional 
groups. Virtually all of the European sub-regional groups exist on the periphery of or 
outside the EU/NATO zone of integration and they largely function as mechanisms for 
managing relations between that zone of integration and the countries and sub-
regions beyond it. 
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Table 1: European Sub-Regional Groups 
Group  Established  Founding Members  Members 2009 
Northern Europe 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council 
(BEAC) 
January 1993  Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Russia, Sweden, 
European Commission 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Russia, Sweden, 
European Commission     
Council of Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS) 
March 1992  Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Iceland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, 
Russia, Sweden, European 
Commission 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Iceland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, 
Russia, Sweden, European 
Commission 
Baltic cooperation  June 1994  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
Baltic Free Trade Area 
(BFTA) 
April 1994  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania  BFTA ceased to exist in 
May 2004 when Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania 
joined the EU 
Nordic-Baltic cooperation 
(‘5+3’; ‘NB8’) 
May 1992  Sweden, Finland, Norway, 
Iceland, Denmark, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania 
Sweden, Finland, Norway, 
Iceland, Denmark, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania 
Central Europe 
Visegrad group  February 1991  Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary 
Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary 
Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA) 
December 1992  Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary 
Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Moldova, Montenegro, 
Serbia 
Central European Initiative 
(CEI) 
November 1989 
Initiative of Four 
Integration 
Group/Quadri-
laterale; became 
Central European 
Initiative in July 
1992 
Austria, Hungary, Italy, 
Yugoslavia 
Albania, Austria, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 
Hungary, Italy, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Ukraine 
Balkans/Black Sea 
Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) 
June 1992  Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
Turkey, Ukraine 
Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine 
Southeast European 
Cooperative Initiative 
(SECI) 
December 1996  Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 
Greece, Hungary, 
Moldova, Romania, 
Slovenia, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia 
Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 
Greece, Hungary, 
Moldova, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, 
Turkey 
South-East European 
Cooperation Process 
(SEECP) 
July 1996  Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Greece, 
Romania, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia 
Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 
Greece, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Romania, 
Serbia, Turkey 
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Stability Pact  June 1999  Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, 
EU member states, USA, 
Russia, international donor 
states and organisations 
The Stability Pact was 
replaced by the Regional 
Cooperation Council in 
February 2008 
Regional Cooperation 
Council (RCC) 
February 2008  Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 
Greece, Kosovo, Monte-
negro, Romania, Serbia, 
Turkey, European Union, 
international donor states 
and organisations 
Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 
Greece, Kosovo, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Romania, 
Serbia, Turkey, European 
Union, international donor 
states and organisations 
Energy Community  July 2006  Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia, 
European Union 
Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia, 
European Union 
Mediterranean 
Union of Arab Maghreb  February 1989  Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Tunisia 
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Tunisia 
Barcelona Process: Union 
for the Mediterranean 
November 1995; 
from July 2008 
the Barcelona 
Process became 
‘The Barcelona 
Process: Union for 
the Mediterra-
nean’  
EU member states, Algeria, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, 
Morocco, Palestinian 
Territories, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey  
 
EU member states, 
Albania, Algeria, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Morocco, 
Palestinian Territories, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey 
Adriatic-Ionian Initiative  March 2000  Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Greece, Italy, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovenia 
Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Greece, Italy, Monte-
negro, Serbia, Slovenia 
Former Soviet Union 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) 
December 1991  Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) 
Collective 
Security Treaty 
(CST) signed in 
May 1992; CSTO 
established in 
October 2002 
Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan 
Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan 
GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova) 
Organization for 
Democracy and 
Economic Development 
October 1997  Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova 
Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova 
Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) 
June 2001  China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
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The Proliferation of European Sub-regional Groups in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
Phase 1: The Post-Cold War Era 
 
The European sub-regional groups which emerged in the 1990s were children of the 
end of the Cold War. European sub-regionalism is not an entirely new phenomenon: 
the Nordic Council and the Benelux union were established in the 1950s, while one 
could also look back to various formations in earlier historical periods. During the 
Cold War, however, European sub-regionalism did not really move beyond the 
Nordic and Benelux groups: although NATO , the Western European Union (WEU), the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Warsaw Pact all comprised sub-
territories of the European continent none reflected the logic of a particular 
geographic sub-region of Europe; although the European integration process was 
initially limited to its six founding members, it was always grounded in the aspiration of 
establishing a larger European process rather than the logic of a particular sub-
region of Europe; and although there were attempts to establish Balkan sub-regional 
cooperation across the East-West divide, these never made much progress. In 
Central Europe, the Baltic, the Balkans and the Black Sea, the East-West Cold War 
division of the continent largely precluded the possibility of sub-regional cooperation. 
 
The political space freed up by end of the Cold War made possible the 
establishment of new sub-regional groups in the 1990s. It is no coincidence that the 
first of the new generation of sub-regional cooperation processes, the Central 
European Initiative (CEI), emerged in the context of East-West détente and Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms: the Alpe-Adria Working Group, linking together 
border regions of Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia, was established in 1978 and 
expanded to include border regions of Hungary in the 1980s; in November 1989 (the 
month the Berlin Wall fell) the four countries agreed to establish the Initiative of Four 
Integration Group or Quadrilaterale; Czechoslovakia joined in 1990, followed by 
Poland in 1991 and in 1992 the body was re-named the CEI (Cviic, 1999, 113-16). The 
implicit if low-key political goal of the CEI and its predecessors was to facilitate the 
re-integration of its Eastern European members with Western Europe. The collapse of 
the Eastern European communist regimes and the end of the Cold War in 1989 
resulted in the establishment of other similar sub-regional groups spanning the old 
East-West divide: the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Council of Baltic 
Sea States (CBSS) in northern Europe and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) in south-eastern Europe. Freed from Soviet hegemony, the Eastern European 
states also had the possibility to establish sub-regional groups to advance their 
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shared interests, resulting in the creation of the Visegrad group and the Central 
European Free Trade Area (CEFTA). 
 
The sub-regional groups established in the 1990s were also a response to the various 
new, post-Cold War policy challenges facing governments. First, the states of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union faced a wide array of challenges in terms of 
reforming political institutions and economies: sub-regional groups were one 
framework for helping to address these challenges by channelling expertise and 
resources and sharing experiences. Second, there was increasing recognition of a 
range of transnational, cross-border challenges facing governments: environmental 
problems; border management issues relating to the movement of people and 
goods; and transnational crime, such as the illegal trafficking of weapons and drugs. 
The transnational nature of these problems suggested that international cooperation 
was vital to addressing them and sub-regional groups emerged as one of the 
frameworks for policy action. The BEAC was set up, for example, in large part to deal 
with the dangerous environmental legacy of the Soviet Union’s industrial and military 
development in the far north. These types of transnational issues are also a significant 
part of the agenda of other sub-regional groups such as the CBSS and the BSEC. 
 
As can be observed from the discussion above, most of the European sub-regional 
groups which have emerged since the early 1990s have been focused around the 
eastern half of the continent – reflecting their genesis in the end of the Cold War and 
the many policy challenges facing the post-communist states. An additional feature 
of Europe’s new sub-regionalism, however, has been a significant southern 
dimension centred on the Mediterranean. By the 1990s a number of trends relating to 
North Africa and the Middle East – illegal immigration, the rise of ‘political Islam’, 
terrorism, environmental degradation and economic underdevelopment – were 
generating growing concern in Europe, especially amongst Southern European 
states. In response, in 1995 the EU established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or 
Barcelona Process, bringing together the EU member states and their neighbours on 
the southern shore of the Mediterranean. The Barcelona Process acts both as a 
multilateral sub-regional forum for dialogue and cooperation and a framework for 
the direction of EU financial and technical assistance to southern partners. Following 
an initiative from French President Nicolas Sarkozy, which caused some controversy 
because it proposed a new Mediterranean Union involving only those EU member 
states in the Mediterranean region, the Barcelona Process was re-launched in 2008 
as the Union for the Mediterranean. The new Union for the Mediterranean, however, 
includes all EU member states and does not appear to be dramatically different in 
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practice from the preceding Barcelona Process (reflecting its hybrid new/old 
character the formal title of the process is now ‘The Barcelona Process; Union for the 
Mediterranean’). 
 
Phase 2: The Enlargement Era 
 
A second phase in the evolution of post-Cold War European sub-regionalism was 
observable in the late 1990s and early 2000s, reflecting two developments. First, the 
eastward enlargement of NATO and EU moved from the drawing board to political 
reality. This process began with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joining 
NATO in 1997-99 and by the late 2000s a swathe of post-communist states, stretching 
from the Baltic states in the north, through Central Europe, to Bulgaria and Romania 
in the south had joined NATO and the EU as full members. In response to fears of 
undermining relations with (and reform efforts in) those countries remaining outside 
the EU and NATO, various initiatives were taken to promote sub-regional cooperation 
as a means of avoiding, or at least limiting the impact of, new ‘dividing lines’. This 
included intensified Western, and in particular EU, involvement in and financial 
support for bodies such as the CBSS, the CEI and the BSEC. In 2004 the EU also 
launched its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which was designed to provide 
enhanced engagement with and financial and technical assistance to the Union’s 
neighbours to the east and south. In the military sphere, efforts were made to 
develop multilateral peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian exercises 
(both in the context of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and on an ad hoc basis) in 
the Baltic Sea, the Balkans and the Black Sea.  
 
At the same time, the ending of the Yugoslav wars triggered a new round of sub-
regional institution-building in the Balkans. The end of the Bosnian war in 1995 led to 
the Dayton peace agreement (which included various sub-regional elements in 
areas such as arms control and military confidence-building), the EU-led Royaumont 
Process, the US initiated South-Eastern European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and 
the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). The 1999 Kosovo war led to 
the creation of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. The logic of these 
initiatives was that the countries of the region faced shared legacies of the Yugoslav 
wars and common political, economic and social challenges and that these could 
therefore be best addressed on a sub-regional basis. In addition, an implicit aim was 
to re-integrate Serbia, which had become a pariah as a result of its role in the 
Yugoslav wars, into the sub-regional and European community of states. The 
proliferation of so many overlapping cooperation initiatives within one sub-region, 
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however, raised questions about both their effectiveness and the division of roles 
between them. The establishment in 2008 of the Regional Cooperation Council 
(RCC), formally replacing the Stability Pact, was a rationalisation of several of the 
earlier initiatives. 
 
Phase 3: The Post-Enlargement Era 
 
By the late 2000s, the picture has moved on once again. The various sub-regional 
institutions established in the 1990s are now established features of the European 
diplomatic landscape, albeit not particularly prominent ones. Meetings and activities 
of various kinds and at various levels occur on an on-going basis. A range of actors 
are regularly involved in multi-lateral sub-regional cooperation: national govern-
ments (foreign ministries, other ministries and other state bodies), non-state actors 
(businesses and civil society organisations) and international administrative and 
policy-making/implementation structures (which many, though not all, of the sub-
regional groups have established). From one perspective, this can be viewed as the 
consolidation of the sub-regional cooperation which emerged in the 1990s. A more 
critical assessment, however, might be that once institutions have been established, 
they have a tendency to perpetuate themselves, continuing along pre-set 
institutional paths, with those actors involved developing a self-interest in maintaining 
the institutions and their activities. From this perspective, one might ask whether 
much of contemporary European sub-regionalism amounts to more than institutional 
inertia - the natural tendency of institutions to maintain themselves – and what 
substantive impact sub-regional institutions and their activities actually have? 
Indeed, one might argue that, behind the institutional inertia of on-going meetings 
and activities, Europe’s new sub-regionalism is a declining force. Answers to these 
questions, however, depend on one’s assessment of the nature, impact and function 
of sub-regionalism in contemporary Europe and this question is returned to later in this 
paper. 
 
Two larger developments also bear significantly on the current status of and future 
prospects for European sub-regional cooperation. First, we are entering a new phase 
in terms of the enlargement of the EU and NATO – what may be termed the ‘post-
enlargement era’. In the 1990s and early 2000s EU and NATO enlargement were on-
going processes and European sub-regionalism was, in part, a response to this – both 
a means of facilitating integration into the EU and NATO for some states and a 
means of avoiding or minimising new ‘dividing lines’ between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’. 
By the late 2000s, the limits of EU and NATO enlargement have become clearer: both 
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organisations have accepted the swathe of Central and Eastern European states 
from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea as full members and, although the process may 
take some time, the so-called Western Balkan states (the former Yugoslav states plus 
Albania) are likely to join both the EU and NATO (the first step occurring in April 2009 
when Albania and Croatia became members of NATO). At the same time, it has 
become clear that the EU is unlikely to accept any of the former Soviet states, such 
as Ukraine, for the foreseeable future. Although NATO formally maintains an ‘open 
door’ policy and the Bush administration pressed NATO to recognise Georgia and 
Ukraine as candidates for membership of the Alliance, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war 
appears to have made it increasingly unlikely that NATO will offer membership to 
either state (Arel, 2008-09). At least in the medium term, therefore, the eastern 
borders of the EU and NATO are likely to be largely those with the countries of the 
former Soviet Union.  
 
Second, the mid-to-late 2000s were marked by a significant downturn in Russo-
Western relations, culminating in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and leading some to 
predict a new Cold War. The downturn in Russo-Western relations reflected a number 
of factors: Russian wariness of the enlargement of the EU and especially NATO; 
Western concerns over Russian efforts to re-establish an exclusive sphere of influence 
in the former Soviet space; Russia’s back-tracking on democracy and human rights 
and shift towards authoritarianism (albeit of a ‘soft’ kind); and Moscow’s opposition 
to the unilateralist strategy of the Bush administration (as well as specific policies such 
as the Iraq war and the planned deployment of missile defences in Poland and the 
Czech Republic). On coming to power in early 2009 the Obama administration 
committed to ‘pressing the reset button’ on US-Russian relations and it may be that 
Washington (and the West more generally) will succeed in establishing more 
cooperative and stable relations with Moscow. Nevertheless, as of 2009, the future of 
Russo-Western relations remains uncertain. 
 
Together, these two developments – the beginning of the post-enlargement era and 
the uncertain state of Russo-Western relations – have significant implications for 
European sub-regionalism. The European sub-regionalism of the 1990s emerged in an 
environment when prospective/on-going NATO and EU enlargement were central 
issues and there were still hopes for a strong partnership between Russia and the 
West. By the late 2000s Europe’s strategic situation has changed, enlargement is 
reaching its limits and an element of geo-strategic competition between Russia and 
the West appears inevitable in the former Soviet space. Interestingly, one 
consequence of this changed geo-strategic context has been two new sub-regional 
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initiatives from the EU: the EU’s Black Sea Synergy, launched in 2007-08, and the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership, launched in 2008-09. The Black Sea Synergy aims both to 
increase the Union’s engagement with the Black Sea region and to support 
cooperation amongst the states of the region. The Eastern Partnership brings 
together the EU and former Soviet republics (specifically the western former Soviet 
republics, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and the Caucasian states, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia) and is designed to provide increased EU support to the 
former Soviet republics – de facto to counter-balance Russia influence. 
 
Rationales and Roles of European Sub-regionalism 
 
What rationales underpinned the various European sub-regional frameworks when 
they were established in the 1990s and what roles have they performed since then? 
Four rationales or roles for the new European sub-regionalism may be identified: a 
bridging role; as a means of helping states to integrate into the EU and NATO; as a 
means of addressing specific transnational problems; and as facilitators of internal 
reform in the post-communist states (for a similar analysis see Bailes, 1999). 
 
The bridging function of sub-regionalism is essentially political, with sub-regional 
groups playing a role either in overcoming historical divisions and/or preventing, or at 
least mitigating, the emergence of new divisions. This role operates in a number of 
ways. In symbolic terms the creation and continued existence of sub-regional groups 
reflects the commitment of participating states to maintain cooperative relations. 
Diplomatically sub-regional groups act as frameworks for on-going dialogue 
between their members (multilaterally and often, in the margins of sub-regional 
discussions, bilaterally). The March 1992 founding statement of the CBSS, for example, 
“welcomed the revival of close cooperation among the Baltic Sea States and the 
strengthening of the ties between them” and defined the CBSS as “a regional 
undertaking to promote new ideas for cooperation” (Council of Baltic Sea States, 
1992). Similarly, the Black Sea states established the BSEC in order to “better realize 
concrete schemes of cooperative action that would contribute directly to the well-
being and prosperity of their peoples and the region” and “to develop 
comprehensive multilateral and bilateral Black Sea economic cooperation” (Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation, 1992a and 1992b). Sub-regional cooperation may also 
be viewed as a form of political confidence-building measure, helping to build trust 
between states. Sub-regional defence cooperation also sometimes acts as a form of 
military confidence-building, as with joint exercises that have been held in the Baltic 
and Black seas and the joint peacekeeping forces which have been developed in 
  13 BRIGG Paper 3/2009 
the Balkans. These various bridging functions have had a number of different foci. In 
the 1990s in particular, sub-regional cooperation was one framework for helping to 
overcome in the Cold War East-West division of Europe. Since the late-1990s, sub-
regional cooperation has been directed towards bridging the potential divides 
created by EU and NATO enlargement. In the Mediterranean, the Barcelona 
Process/Union for the Mediterranean has in significant part been an effort to bridge 
the geo-cultural divide between Christian Europe and Islamic North Africa and the 
Middle East. The July 2008 founding declaration of the Union for the Mediterranean 
thus refers to “a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, democracy, 
prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding” (Union for the Mediterra-
nean, 2008). 
 
A second function of (some) sub-regional groups has been to help their members to 
integrate into the EU and NATO. This was most obviously the case with the Visegrad 
group and CEFTA, which in the early and mid-1990s acted as a lobbying groups for 
their members’ bids to join the EU and NATO. Similar functions were also performed 
by the tri-Baltic (Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian) cooperation and by the Adriatic 
cooperation between Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. The willingness and ability 
of states to cooperate with one another sub-regionally has also to some extent been 
viewed in the West as an indicator of ‘responsible’, good-neighbourly behaviour and 
hence of states’ readiness to join the EU and NATO. More concretely, since states 
often face common challenges in conforming to the acquis of the EU and NATO, 
sub-regional cooperation has to some extent also been a mechanism for states to 
share experiences as part of their pre-accession and accession processes. There 
have, however, been certain tensions between sub-regionalism and the pursuit of EU 
and NATO membership: states aspiring to EU and NATO membership have feared 
that sub-regional groups may be viewed as alternatives to full integration into the EU 
and NATO; although candidates for EU and NATO membership have proved willing 
to cooperate with one another sub-regionally, there has also been an element of 
competition between them in the race to join the EU and NATO; and although both 
the EU and NATO have sought to promote sub-regional cooperation, their primary 
relationships with aspirant members have been bilateral and membership credentials 
are assessed on candidate’s national progress in reforms. As a consequence, while 
EU/NATO enlargement and sub-regional cooperation have proved to be largely 
complementary processes, part of the logic of EU and NATO membership has 
worked against sub-regional cooperation. 
 
  14 Andrew Cottey 
A third function of sub-regional groups has been to address functional, especially, 
transnational policy challenges facing states. Here the BEAC’s role in addressing the 
environmental problems arising from the Soviet Union’s Cold War military and 
industrial development is perhaps the archetypal example. Most of the other sub-
regional groups – the CBSS, the CEI, the Visegrad group, the BSEC, the Stability 
Pact/RCC and the Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean – also include 
functional and/or transnational policy areas such as economics, environment, 
borders and customs, energy, infrastructure, tourism and culture, within their remits. 
The implicit logic is twofold: first, many of these challenges are cross-border in nature 
and therefore require cross-border policy responses, including at the sub-regional 
level; second, states within sub-regions often face similar national policy challenges 
in these areas and the exchanging of experiences and coordination of policies can 
help in addressing these challenges. 
 
Fourth, sub-regional frameworks can act as facilitators, to some extent even drivers, 
of political, economic and military reforms at the national level. When the CBSS was 
established, for example, two of its six priorities were to provide assistance to its post-
communist members in developing new democratic institutions and in making the 
transition from a planned to a market economy (Council of Baltic Sea States, 1992). 
One of the implicit goals of the Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean has 
been to encourage reforms in its North African/Middle Eastern members, not only in 
technical areas such as the economy and environmental protection, but also in the 
more sensitive areas of human rights and political institutions. Sub-regional institutions 
may facilitate or drive reforms in two particular ways: they may act as frameworks for 
policy transfer, with sub-regional meetings and exchanges providing the context for 
the transfer of ideas, practices and models; and they may act as frameworks for the 
provision of financial and technical assistance (with donors providing assistance 
through sub-regional institutions). 
 
More Than Just Rhetorical (Sub)regionalism? 
 
Critics sometimes charge that regional and sub-regional groups amount to little more 
than rhetorical (sub-)regionalism: they are high on the rhetoric of good neighbourly 
relations, common interests and cooperation, but in practice their impact on 
relations between their members or member’s domestic policies is minimal at best, 
while (sub-)regional activities are often very limited in scope and substance. In the 
case of the European sub-regional groups there is some legitimacy to this criticism. 
The European sub-regional groups are relatively lightweight compared to the EU, 
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NATO and even, to some extent, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) or the Council of Europe. The European sub-regional groups lack the 
economic resources, redistributive capacity and legal authority of the EU or the 
collective defence capacity and integrated military command structures of NATO. 
They also lack even the relatively weaker operational capacities of the OSCE and 
the Council of Europe, such as the OSCE’s conflict prevention and resolution missions 
or the Council of Europe’s election monitoring infrastructure. The European sub-
regional groups can therefore easily be derided as little more than excuses for 
‘diplomatic tourism’: they provide opportunities for diplomats (and other 
participants) to travel, but the substantive output of their many summits, meetings, 
w o r k i n g  g r o u p s  a n d  t h e  l i k e  m a y  b e  v i e w e d  a s  d i s t i n c t l y  l i m i t e d .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  
European sub-regional groups may also be criticised as ‘jacks of all trades, masters of 
none’: most of the groups have broad agendas, with theoretical commitments to 
cooperate on a wide range of issues, but have not focused on or specialised in 
particular areas and arguably lack the capacity to deliver across the full range of 
issues within their formal remit. Indeed, there has been an implicit recognition of this 
weakness within many of the sub-regional groups, with efforts to narrow their 
agendas and focus on particular areas or concrete projects. Finally, it is easy to 
identify ‘failures’ of sub-regional groups: the BSEC has had little impact on resolving 
the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and could not prevent 
the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, despite these states shared membership of the group; 
Belarus’s membership of the CEI has had little if any impact on the country’s 
authoritarian regime; and the various Balkan cooperation initiatives have had little 
bearing on Kosovo’s troubled transition to independent statehood. One should note 
here, however, that criticising sub-regional groups for these ‘failures’ ignores the fact 
that such problems are generally beyond the mandate of these groups and sets the 
bar for success particularly high and that the ‘stronger’ European institutions - the EU 
and NATO - have not been markedly more successful in addressing these problems. 
 
Analysing the impact of sub-regional groups also reflects the larger social scientific 
problem of assessing the impact of international institutions. Cause-effect relation-
ships are notoriously difficult to identify, let alone ‘prove’, in the social world and 
analyses of international institutions, such as sub-regional groups, inevitably suffer 
from this problem. It may be argued that sub-regional groups have an impact on 
international relations – the prospects for cooperation or conflict between their 
members – and on the domestic policies of members, but how far this is actually the 
case is inherently uncertain. Consider the following example: since the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, worst case scenarios of armed conflict between Russia and the 
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Baltic states over the rights of the Russian minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
and/or borders have been avoided; it may be argued that sub-regional cooperation 
in the CBSS and other Baltic fora have contributed to such conflict avoidance (for 
example, by helping to build confidence and a sense of common identity within the 
region and by encouraging moderation and compromise between the Baltic states 
and their Russian minority populations); alternatively, it may be argued that fears of 
conflict between Russia and the Baltic states were exaggerated, that the avoidance 
of such conflict is attributable to other factors (such as EU and NATO pressure on the 
Baltic states) and that the impact of sub-regional cooperation has been at most 
minimal in relation to this issue. Another example illustrates the same point: the 
Central and Eastern European states which are now members of the EU and NATO 
have arguably made significant progress in reforming political institutions, public 
policies and economic structures since the 1990s; it may be argued that sub-regional 
institutions have contributed significantly to such reforms through the processes of 
policy transfer and technical and financial assistance noted above; alternatively, it 
may be countered that the central driver of reform has been EU and NATO 
enlargement (in particular, the powerful leverage provided to the EU and NATO by 
the ‘carrot’ of membership and the ‘stick’ of withholding membership) and that sub-
regional institutions were marginal to this process. These examples illustrate the 
inherent difficulty of assessing the impact of sub-regional institutions: one may 
debate which of these interpretations is most convincing, but from a social scientific 
perspective it is difficult (if not impossible) to present decisive evidence one way or 
the other. 
 
The problem of assessing the impact of sub-regional institutions is compounded by 
the absence of detailed evaluations or assessments of these institutions and their 
various policies and programmes. The concept and practice of policy/programme 
evaluations has been developed since the 1960s, with governments – and more 
recently international organisations such as the World Bank – employing detailed 
evaluations, with developed methodologies, to assess the impact of various social 
and economic policies and programmes (see Baker, 2000; Donaldson and Scriven, 
2002; and Rossi, Lipsey and Freeman 2004). More recently, similar approaches have 
been used in the form of impact assessments (for example, Environmental Impact 
Assessments and Conflict Impact Assessments) to assess the likely impact of potential 
or proposed programmes or policies. Such evaluations and assessments cannot 
entirely overcome the fundamental social scientific problem of assessing cause-
effect relationships in the complex social reality of human interaction, but they do at 
least provide more rigorous and developed mechanisms for assessing the impact of 
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institutions, policies and programmes. The European sub-regional groups and their 
member governments should consider undertaking such evaluations of sub-regional 
groups, policies and programmes in order to shed light on their impacts, successes 
and limitations. 
 
If assessing the impact of the European sub-regional groups is difficult, two particular 
areas are worth some further analysis: the degree and nature of institutionalisation 
which has developed within these groups and the extent to which member 
governments and other institutions have been willing and able to make resources 
available to them. Institutionalisation may be defined in this context as (i) the 
establishment of frameworks and processes in which states and other actors meet on 
a regular basis and (ii) the allocation of capacities and power to supranational 
bureaucracies. Such institutionalisation matters because it can help to develop 
habits of cooperation amongst states (and other actors), contribute to the 
development of a sense of common identity and interests and facilitate the co-
ordination of policies and/or the development of common policies. In the absence 
of institutionalisation cooperation is likely to be one off or ad hoc and easily 
vulnerable to disruption or loss of political support. The European sub-regional groups 
have all developed a degree of institutionalisation. In all these groups foreign 
ministers (and/or other ministers) meet on a regular basis (usually annually), there are 
on-going working contacts between lower level government officials in foreign 
ministries and other government departments and in many of the sub-regional 
groups there are also regular contacts involving other actors (businesses, scientists 
and other professionals and non-governmental/civil society groups). Such meetings, 
working contacts and the like are primarily examples of the first part of the definition 
of institutionalisation used above. In terms of the second element of institutionalisa-
tion – the allocation of capacities and power to supranational bureaucracies – the 
European sub-regional groups have taken more limited steps. Most of the sub-
regional groups have developed some form of secretariat or similar supranational 
body for the coordination of activities: the powers of these secretariats are, however, 
rather limited, as are their size (in terms of staff numbers) and resources. The 
institutionalisation of the sub-regional groups has therefore been largely inter-
governmental, with the supranational elements that have been established having 
little power to develop or implement policy and few, if any, centrally-controlled 
resources to allocate to programmes or activities. Nevertheless, although the degree 
of institutionalisation of the European sub-regional groups is significantly less than that 
which has occurred within the EU and NATO, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
institutionalisation of these groups has contributed to the development of habits of 
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cooperation, a sense of common identity and interests amongst their members and, 
albeit in limited forms, policy coordination and common policies. 
 
The question of resources is also important in assessing the European sub-regional 
groups: the extent to which groups are able to have an impact depends, in part, on 
how far they have the financial resources to fund programmes, policies and 
activities. The sub-regional groups are essentially dependent on the voluntary 
financial support of their member states and international organisations such as the 
EU and the World Bank: none of the sub-regional groups has established a budgetary 
system involving significant and on-going resource transfers or a large centrally 
administered budget; programmes and activities are therefore largely funded on an 
ad hoc basis. In this context, there is a difference between some of the northern 
European groups (in particular, the BEAC and the CBSS) and some of their Central 
European and Balkan counterparts (the CEI and the BSEC, for example). The BEAC 
and the CBSS have a number of relatively wealthy members (the Nordic-
Scandinavian states and Germany), which have been willing to provide substantial 
resources to support sub-regional cooperation processes. In contrast, the financial 
resources available to support the activities of the CEI and the BSEC have been more 
limited. The CEI has been supported financially by Austria and Italy, the groups’ 
wealthiest members, but the majority of its members are relatively poor and Italy and 
Austria’s capacity to support the CEI is not comparable to that of the Nordic-
Scandinavian states and Germany in the CBSS and the BEAC. The financial 
constraints on the BSEC are even greater: it is composed primarily of relatively poor 
former Soviet and Balkan states and neither Russia and Turkey, BSEC’s largest 
members, nor Greece, its wealthiest member in per capita terms, possess the 
economic resources to make very major financial contributions to Black Sea sub-
regional projects. The EU (in the form of the European Commission) is a member of 
many of the sub-regional groups and provides financial support for them. The EU’s 
‘Black Sea Synergy’ policy, adopted in 2007-08, was in part an acknowledgement of 
the financial constraints facing BSEC and an attempt to increase EU financial and 
technical support for Black Sea sub-regional cooperation (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2007).  Global financial and development organisations, 
such as the World Bank and the UN Development Programme, also provide financial 
support for cooperation activities in the various European sub-regions, but their inputs 
are also constrained by the many other calls on their limited resources.  
 
The Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean operates under a different 
model, in which the EU has been much more centrally involved: the Barcelona 
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Process was essentially an EU initiative and the EU has been effectively the sole 
funder of the Process, with EU funds driving virtually all of its activities. Even in this 
case, however, critics argue that significantly higher levels of funding are required. 
Given the economic and budgetary challenges facing the EU and its member 
states, and the many other internal and global calls on the Union’s limited resources, 
however, major increases in EU financial support for sub-regional cooperation are 
unrealistic. In short, while member states, the EU and international financial and 
development organisations do provide financial support to underpin European sub-
regional cooperation, this support is not on a scale likely to fundamentally transform 
the sub-regions’ economies or politics.  
 
Overall, one should probably be cautious in assessing the impact and value of the 
European sub-regional groups which have emerged since the end of the Cold War. 
Nevertheless, there is a good case that these groups have, in various ways, helped to 
overcome the Cold War division of the continent, facilitated the integration of some 
states into the EU and NATO, contributed to reform processes in post-communist 
Europe and North Africa, assisted in addressing transnational policy challenges in 
areas such as the environment, helped mitigate some potential negative 
consequences of NATO and EU enlargement and diminished ‘civilisational’ tensions 
across the Mediterranean. The impact of European sub-regionalism may not have 
been dramatic, but a balanced assessment suggests that it has been positive and 
not entirely insignificant. 
 
Conclusion: Sub-regionalism in the Post-enlargement Era 
 
The economic, political and military integration of European states, which takes 
place in the framework of the EU but also NATO, and the extension of this process to 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, constitute the dominant political reality 
of contemporary Europe. The European sub-regional groups emerged at a particular 
juncture in this process marked by the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 
extension of the integration process to Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, 
the sub-regional groups played a variety of roles. As was argued above, we are now 
entering the post-enlargement era: while it is possible, in the longer term, that some 
of the former Soviet states may join the EU and/or NATO, for the foreseeable future 
this seems unlikely. The analysis developed here suggests that sub-regional coopera-
tion has a continuing role to play in this new environment. Sub-regional groups help 
to bridge the divide between the enlarged EU/NATO and their neighbours. For the 
former Soviet countries, sub-regional groups provide frameworks for supporting 
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reforms, linking them with the West and quietly counter-balancing Russian power. In 
terms of Russo-Western relations, sub-regional groups such as the BEAC, the CBSS and 
the BSEC provide useful frameworks for facilitating engagement, building a sense of 
common interests and drawing regions of Russia into cooperative networks with 
neighbouring states and the West. In the Mediterranean, the Barcelona 
Process/Union for the Mediterranean provides an important long-term institutional 
framework for avoiding a North-South ‘clash of civilisations’ and promoting reform in 
North Africa. Sub-regional frameworks, of course, will be only one of an array of 
policies and institutions, alongside the EU and NATO’s larger neighbourhood policies, 
bilateral relations between the EU and NATO and individual neighbouring states, the 
wider strategic relationship between the West and pan-European institutions such as 
the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Sub-regional groups thus reinforce and 
supplement these wider efforts to build cooperative relations between the enlarged 
EU and NATO and their neighbours and to promote reform in countries on the EU and 
NATO’s periphery. The sub-regional emphasis of these groups, however, also gives 
them a distinctive role: they are an implicit recognition that geography and history 
mean that states in particular sub-regions share certain common challenges and 
that it makes sense to try to respond to these also, if not only, at the sub-regional 
level. 
 
The challenge for governments and policy-makers is to creatively make use of the 
potential of sub-regional frameworks. One area for particular attention may be the 
interface between the larger EU and NATO integration processes and sub-regional 
cooperation. We are already moving towards a Europe of flexible integration, with 
EU members participating in different elements of integration, such as the euro and 
the Schengen agreement, to different degrees, and non-EU members, such as 
Norway and Switzerland, participating in elements of EU integration. The ENP further 
extends elements of EU cooperation to neighbouring states and regions, although 
this in practice takes place largely on a bilateral basis between the Union and 
individual partners. The EU’s Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean, Black 
Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership are designed to build on the ENP, but also to 
give it a stronger sub-regional dimension, with policies tailored to particular sub-
regions. Giving greater substance to these various EU-related sub-regional initiatives, 
however, remains a significant challenge for both the Union and the states of these 
sub-regions. 
 
Alyson Bailes has described sub-regional groups as the ‘Cinderellas of European 
security’: the poorly dressed relatives, compared to the more expensively garbed EU 
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and NATO or even the OSCE and the Council of Europe (Bailes, 1997). In the fairytale, 
of course, Cinderella gets to wear the ball gown and marry the prince. Sub-regional 
groups are unlikely to find themselves wearing the most expensive haute couture or 
often being the guests of honour on the European diplomatic circuit. Nevertheless, 
they have a beauty and value of their own which should be recognised and 
encouraged. 
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